Materiale Bruxelles

M-am gandit sa pun pe blog – in engleza (nu le-am tradus, deocamdata, in romana) – textele pe care le-am folosit in interventiile mele de la Bruxelles, de saptamana trecuta, in legatura cu problemele politicii externe ale Uniunii Europene  (Future challenges for the EU’s foreign policy). Sper sa le gasiti interesante.

“In my intervention I will address what I consider the main challenges to the foreign policy of the EU, in the context of the global economic crisis and the EU’s efforts to define a stronger and more coherent foreign policy.

General comments:

When talking European and international matters, the current context is shaped by the economic crisis, the results of the recent European Parliamentary elections and the efforts to pledge, this year, the Lisbon Treaty. These issues, although apparently distinct, share common roots, to which I will briefly refer in the next moments.

First, the European elections revealed a modified European social and political pattern of behavior. The increased popular support for the right-wing parties is natural during periods of economic hardship, such as the one we are crossing today.

Two forces have troubled the European society: the tendency towards economic protectionism and a certain nationalistic appetence. Both derive from the instinct to protect, shelter and look inward, in times of crisis, rather than expand, orient outward. Nevertheless, history has shown that protectionism is not a solution, even though it might be the first instinctive reaction to the problem.

An alarming result of these elections was the low turnout, which in the long run gives a worrying signal about people growing increasingly distant from the European spirit.

Given the framework of nationalistic and protectionist tendencies, provoked by the economic downturn, as well as the efforts towards having the Lisbon Treaty ratified by all EU member states, we shall rightly ask ourselves which are the perspectives of the EU foreign policy and which are the challenges that lie ahead.

The enlargement process, in strict connection with development and migration issues, seems to be a sufferer of the economic downturn. There are, undoubtedly, costs of enlargement, but as we know, no victory comes without sacrifices. Just as the economic protectionist tendencies should be avoided; the political centripetal propensity should be opposed. I believe that the door of the EU should be kept open, in a spirit of cooperation and desire to spread the values that consecrated it.

Eastward and southward enlargements are long-term investments for the EU, which will return dividends in terms of security, political and economic stability. Enlargement should be a medicine against surrounding instability. The recent episode of the human rights violations in the Republic of Moldova, economic and energetic hardships of Ukraine and last year’s hot outburst of conflict between Georgia and Russia have been exclamation marks for the EU and have stirred a prompt reaction from the latter.

EU’s strong-willed and pro-active involvement in all these issues is not only desirable, but necessary. Deeper cooperation between the EU and the Republic of Moldova is to bring the desired and long-awaited political and economic reforms.

The EU has adapted itself to these evolutions by creating innovative instruments, such as the Monitoring Mission in Georgia and EULEX aimed at encouraging peace, stability and institutional building. The Eastern Partnership is an important tool for legal approximation for the six Eastern ENP countries, while the Black Sea Synergy has already made progress in bringing together eastern ENP countries, Turkey, as a negotiating country, and  Russia, as a strategic partner of the EU.

The European perspective of the Western Balkans’ countries will be crucial for the region’s stability and prosperity. Having in mind these objectives, Romania has promoted trilateral regional meetings, comprising both EU and non-EU member states, in order to encourage European emulation. This regional cooperation initiatives will boost economic cooperation and pave the way for the interconnection of the energy infrastructure in Europe. The proposal for an EU strategy for the Danube region subscribes to the same objective of promoting economic and political cooperation in the area.

East European and South Caucasian countries’ improved individual relations with the EU, based on sector partnership agreements and political dialogue will subsequently create a positive spillover into the energy dilemma: how to diversify sources and transport routes, how to guarantee consumption. This interdependent link should push further and faster the discussions regarding the single European energy market. Securing a competitive, liberalized and transparent energy market would bring both an economic and a political answer in relation with Russia.

Energy-wise, the relation with Turkey and the Caucasian countries should be constructive if we are to have a win-win solution: comprising both European integration and the safety of diversified energy routes.

Efforts to tackle illegal migration from Africa and South-East Asia, coming towards the EU either through the Mediterranean or the Black Sea region, should bear in mind that development is the final goal of migration management policies.

Another visible challenge for the EU will be assuring the trans-Atlantic tandem, while promoting a global European role: addressing responsibly the issue of climate change (reducing greenhouse gas emissions and improving energy efficiency), being part of international peace-keeping and post-conflict reconstruction missions, offering the needed aid to Irak, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Part of the global EU role will be enhancing relations with emerging economies, especially the BRIC countries, known to stand for 80% of the world population and 70% of the global currency reserves.

If we are to talk about a strong, visible and effective EU foreign policy, assuming its good-will role and promoting its peaceful values, having a single voice in foreign relations will be of paramount importance.

New Challenges:

- Almost everything that has happened in Europe lately, in terms of international security and cooperation, highlighted new challenges and even threats  for the EU foreign policy – evolutions related to Kosovo, the war in Georgia, the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over gas, the parliamentary elections in Moldova.

- Enlargement has brought the European Union closer to regions that emerge and shape themselves as major challenges for the security and well-being of the EU Member States, and consequently for the EU foreign policy.

- One of them is the Western Balkans Region. What distinguishes the Western Balkans from other neighbouring regions, even though there are many problems still to be solved, is the existence of a political project: in this case, the European and Euro-Atlantic perspective, which might be supported by consistent assistance by the EU, and NATO, in the field of reform and development and also in forgetting differences from the past and looking to the future. Of course, that “need to do list” by the states in the Western Balkans is still long. How soon it will be shortened depends on the political will of those involved, and also on the EU policy towards the region.

- An essential element of this policy is that the EU membership perspective should remain open for all the countries in the region and positive signals to that effect should be send constantly.

- The other one is the Wider Black Sea Region that shapes itself as an emerging hub of European security, within a process which is currently unfolding. A range of developments over the past few years, particularly the growing strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia – due to NATO’s role in Afghanistan – and an increasing awareness of the implications of EU energy dependence on Russia and of the Caspian’s role as a potential alternative, Turkey’s aspirations to EU membership and the “coloured” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine have contributed, in combination, to the Wider Black Sea region being seen as an important component of European security.

- These developments have also made a range of issues connected to the Wider Black Sea Region central to the security of EU Member States, as they have brought a wide array of traditional and non-traditional security concerns connected to the region in closer proximity of the EU.

- Not to forget Belarus. Geographically it is in Europe, though politically it is not yet there. But it should and it will be there one day, and the EU foreign policy should pave the way and even accelerate evolutions for that to happen. In fact, the latest EU initiative, the Eastern Partnership, may well be the only instrument to offer a chance of redressing for this country.

- Of course, much has been done in this Eastern policy, in particular in defining and securing EU interests in the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy region, in developing bilateral and regional cooperation with all countries beyond the current borders of the EU and in setting up a long-term and viable partnership with Russia. The future EU-Russia agreement, the Eastern Partnership and, respectively, the Black Sea Synergy and the Northern Dimension, are all expressions of the above-mentioned efforts. All these are, or have to become, mutually reinforcing instruments.

- Close monitoring and evaluation of these initiatives is important in order for the EU to be able to build up upon their results real regional strategies. Such strategies should address also the collaboration of the EU with the regional actors,  including the regional organisations.

- The good principles of democracy and rule of law are absolutely needed, but their acceptance is not enough. The lesson learned in the last years is that any time something happens, the international community becomes reactive instead of promoting a proactive policy. Whether we speak about either the Eastern Partnership or the Black Sea Synergy or other initiatives, we need to come with a more articulated European policy.

- A particular challenge poses “frozen conflicts”, or protracted conflicts. The EU’s enlargement has brought the unresolved conflicts over Transnistria in Moldova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and the region-wide conflict in the North Caucasus in closer proximity of the EU.

- The EU has done a lot in this area given its posture of a “big mediation and conflict resolution machine, based on law and non-stop negotiations”, as Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, termed the EU back in 2006.

- The unresolved conflicts pose distinct challenges in the traditional military security area, but are also closely entangled with “soft” security issues connected to state weakness and organized crime, and to the role of external powers. Peacekeeping and negotiating formats – in many of which EU participate – have proven highly inefficient and largely reflect the geopolitical situation of the early 1990s. In reality, they grant Russia control over these processes, even though Russia is also de facto a party to the conflicts.

- These conflicts mean instability for all of us. The consequence of instability is a tendency leading to stagnation, especially in the trans-border economic cooperation, in addition to the consequences for our common security.

- Therefore it is perhaps time, as we think of the EU foreign policy, to work out a Platform – which could take the form of a General Understanding, General Agreement, Framework Agreement or General Principles – for the peaceful settlement of unresolved conflicts, whose central starting point should be the people living in those conflict areas.

- Indeed, people living in those areas are looking for free movement of persons, services and goods, for economic development. They have more or less the same expectations like the people living in other parts of the Europe. These people suffer as individuals, because they are not using the general benefits of the cooperation between states, of the trans-border co-operation. The economic and cultural projects avoid them. They are left pray of despotic and corrupt, or militaristic and adventuristic regimes, and the international community does nothing to put them in contact with other realities, with the democratic world.

- Such a Platform would define the general principles of the settlement, including, inter alia, such principles as:

• direct relations of separatist entities with the EU, similar to those envisaged in the EU Action Plans with the States in the region;
• permeability of borders between separatist entities and the states of the region;
• rule of law, human rights and democratic institutions in the separatist entities;
• general demilitarization of the separatist entities and the military disengagement of the states where they are.

- The Platform would also define:

• the format of negotiations for each and every conflict, since each of them has its own specificities;
• the rules of conduct in negotiations;
• involvement of NGOs in facilitating and supporting the negotiations;
• the EU support for the economic development and building democratic institutions, linked to the effective progress in negotiations;
• confidence building measures between states involved in conflicts;
• projects aimed at building confidence of separatist entities in the EU.

- Implementation of the Platform could be facilitated using the expertise and involvement of other international organisations in the peace efforts, particularly the OSCE and the United Nations.

- Such a Platform could be launched by the European Council in the form of a EU sponsored conference, in which would participate, on an equal footing:

• EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy;
• the Commissioner for External Relations and Eastern Neighbourhood Policy;
• the representatives of the parties to the conflicts – both state and non-state actors (separatist regions), on the clear understanding that participation in the conference does not imply mutual diplomatic recognition of the States and entities parties to the conflict;
• representatives of neighbouring States;
• the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE;
• the president of the UN Security Council;
• the UN Secretary General;
• representatives of other States that the European Council decides to invite.

- These are ideas to think about. There may be other ways to generate renewed efforts and political will to bring lasting and fair settlement to such prolonged conflicts, which should be one of the objectives of the EU foreign policy. We need to be creative and innovative in designing the future EU foreign policy.

 

Ten conclusions

EU attractiveness in the neighborhood should not be taken for granted. Recent polls show that EU is seen as an alternative at best by an average of 40% of the population in countries covered by EaP. For many in the Eastern Neighborhood EU is still a dream. There is a big difference between what these countries really need and EU is really ready to offer.

1. Competition with Russia for influence in that region will be part of the geopolitical paradigm for decades. EU (alone) could not be able to transform its economic power in the eastern neighborhood in (Western) political influence. The EU remains the most powerful political model in the region, but Europeans have failed to cultivate their soft power. The EU has a more attractive governance model than Russia, but good governance models do not always win.
2. The EU is queasy about using military means to exert its power and has shown reluctance to get involved in the region’s ongoing security crises. The EU has a major hard power credibility to overcome.
3. Europe needs a healthy and robust “realpolitik”, one that is free from illusions about the giant next door. The trick for Europe is to counter-balance Russian self-interest. EU has to agree on and jointly promote Europe’s own interests, and to channel relations with Moscow into an international framework that upholds the rule of law.
4. The in-depth examination of EU-Russia relations of November last year highlighted the interdependence of Europe and Russia, with Russia now the EU’s third largest trading partner after the United States and China, and the EU by far Russia’s number one trading partner. Energy interdependence will continue to be pivotal to economic relations between the EU and Russia, with the stakes high for both parties.
5. EU has to strike the right balance between sharing common interests with Russia in the face of international security challenges that range from peace in the Middle East to relations with Iran and global climate change and the issue of “shared values”. Russia is neither a democracy nor as the old Soviet Union. It is worth asking ourselves whether what Chris Patten said only few years ago is still valid, namely that “Europe should work for a comprehensive partnership with Russia but at the moment it is nonsense to suggest that this will be based on shared values”.
6. The Transatlantic dialogue should constantly address problems pertaining to EU’s Eastern Neighborhood, including Russia. More focus should be given to joint strategic assessments by EU and NATO on future developments in the Black Sea area, the Caucasus and Central Asia. European and Euro-Atlantic security concerns are related to unpredictable internal and regional evolutions in those areas. This would have the benefit of drawing the attention of EU and NATO Member States to those perimeters that are perceived to be most at risk of violent flare. Attention in itself could deter aggression and prevent conflicts.
7. It seems that now, after turning its back on the World Trade Organization, Russia prefers being a distinct regional power that can offer alternative economic and military institutions and alliances to the West’s. Under these circumstances, it is worth wondering what kind of strategic partnership could the EU establish with Moscow?
8. Europe has to be clear on the principles that maintain peace and stability on our continent, such as respect for independence, the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity, Theories of zones of influence or zero-sum games derived from the outdated diplomatic approach that underpinned so many of the conflicts that wracked Europe in the past.

10. Instead of a one-size-fits-all policy focused on enlargement, the EU needs to develop a comprehensive, sophisticated and realistic political strategy to complement the rather technical approach provided by the ENP and EaP. EU states and institutions must concentrate their coordinated endeavors towards boosting their powers of attraction in the eastern neighborhood, while developing imaginative policies to help its neighbors prevent and cope with political and economic crises.”